able danger, part iii

as stated before, the 911 commission's changing story on the inability/resistance to integrating able danger info into its final report demonstrates the difficulty of intelligence gathering and law enforcement in the current environment.
the always compelling mark steyn gets it right:

Sept. 11 was a total government fiasco: CIA, FBI, INS, FAA, all the hot shot acronyms failed spectacularly. But appoint an official commission and let them issue an official report and suddenly everyone says, oh, well, this is the official version of 9/11; if they say something didn't happen, it can't possibly have happened.
[snip]
Maybe we need a 9/11 Commission Commission to investigate the 9/11 Commission. A body intended to reassure Americans that the lessons of that terrible day had been learned instead engaged in what at best was transparent politicking and collusion in posterior-covering and at worst was something a whole lot darker and more disturbing.

this incident undermines the belief that the necessary changes can be made in a sufficient manner